
1. Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence based on assumption that Khrushchev would and could deliver on Khrushchev's commitment to remove all offensive weapons systems in Cuba and Europe. UN verification satisfy U. S. and other NATO countries this is not done and does not require

2. Although four days have now passed since understanding reached and U Thant has made best efforts, all we have so far is verbal assurances by Sov reps in NY and Cuba to UN and UN without element of verification which in view history of this affair ^{was} regarded as essential

3. US has acted expeditiously and in good faith, promptly accepting Soviet proposal that ICRC act as UN agent for inspection incoming vessels. (US believes we should promptly move to put this in effect with or without Cuban agreement. Part of instructions on this will come later today). We also promptly responded SFR request to inspect quarantine and return facilities during period of Havana visit. Also as being aware US has close watch on movement and actions of Cuban ships and aircraft in Caribbean area.

DECK ASSIGNED

1990

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JK Line

1495 Date 1/21/78

by: SA Johnson /SM/ Mac Date: 11/13/78

1990

Cleared w/ White House: McG. Bundy
The Secretary (in substance)
For Mr. Fitz

g/a - Mr. Brubeck

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...and the ...

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agreement, e.g. arrest of group with boat in Florida yesterday.

4. On question verification US has expressed willingness accept wide range of possible US arrangements but there does not yet appear likelihood even any one of these can be implemented.

5. President's responsibility for US security demands that in absence US verification, US undertake whatever steps it can to provide verification. Subordinate to this overriding consideration but nevertheless important is assurance to US and IA public.

6. Thus, although much less satisfactory than US verification on the ground and from the air with cooperation Sovs and Cuba, US must in elemental interests of safety continue aerial surveillance. This surveillance is being carried out in as unprovocative a manner and on as limited a scale as possible by unarmed aircraft. While US accepts that some conventional anti-aircraft guns may be under Cuban control, it cannot accept that sophisticated weapons and control systems, including SAM's, do not require participation of Sov technicians and thus are not or could not be made subject to Soviet control. If US reconnaissance aircraft fired on or destroyed, serious question appropriate means protect US aircraft will arise. We might thus face a cycle of action and reaction which would put us back where we were last week. Thus of utmost importance Sovs immediately take measures to assure reconnaissance aircraft not fired on.

7. Second sentence of President's letter to Chairman Khrushchev of October 27
QUOTE
is clear in covering/ all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use UNOP.
This covers not only systems under Soviet control but also those allegedly under Cuban control. The President considers Khrushchev's reply of October 28 as clear.

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...that all of these arms are to be dismantled, stored and returned to the Soviet Union. We would like to state a clear declaration that the U.S. are in total control of the dismantling of these arms. In addition, you would like to know if the missiles are being removed, there seems to need for Soviets to look in Cuba equipment and military technicians brought to Cuba primarily to protect the offensive weapons. Note that HAM's use missile fuel which is proscribed under quarantine regulations. President's undertaking against invasion is an adequate assurance that these weapons are not needed.

9. The President particularly desires that there should be RPT no discussion of wider issues from our side until the offensive weapons in Cuba are clearly on their way home. You must therefore avoid any exploration tempting fields like Berlin and disarmament, making it plain that while we look forward to such discussion later, we cannot get anywhere on anything else until we have successfully put in operation the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement on this present matter.

RUSK